The increase in government adoption of online voting comes hand in hand with higher security and privacy requirements. A key security area for governments implementing online voting is end to end verifiability: allowing voters to verify that the ballot they cast includes the selections they intended, check that their vote has been stored in the ballot box and verify that their vote has been tallied in the final results.
During the upcoming E-VOTE-ID conference, Scytl online voting experts will delve into the government adoption and evolution of online voting verifiability (individual and universal) protocols and technology. Since the introduction of online voting verifiability in the 2011 elections in Norway, additional governments have followed similar steps in the implementation of verifiability in their voting systems. But not all the systems have adopted the same levels of verifiability or the same range of cryptographic mechanisms. For instance, Estonia (2013) and New South Wales (2015) started by adopting individual verifiability in their online voting systems. Switzerland updated its regulation in 2014 to include individual and universal verifiability in order to address the previous limitation of only a small percentage of voters being able to vote online; the Swiss Post system is the first and only voting system in Switzerland to receive certification for 50% of voters.